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Can Institutional Investors Bias Real Estate Portfolio Appraisals?  Evidence 
from the Market Downturn 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the extent to which institutional investors may have influenced 
independent real estate appraisals during the financial crisis.   A conceptual model of the 
determinants of client influence on real estate appraisals is proposed.  It is suggested that the 
extent of clients’ ability and willingness to bias appraisal outputs is contingent upon market and 
regulatory environments (ethical norms and legal and institutional frameworks), the salience of 
the appraisal(s) to the client, financial incentives for the appraiser to respond to client pressure, 
organisational culture, the level of moral reasoning of both individual clients and appraisers, 
client knowledge and the degree of appraisal uncertainty.  The potential of client influence to 
bias ostensibly independent real estate appraisals is examined using the opportunity afforded by 
the market downturn commencing in 2007 in the UK.  During the market turbulence at the end of 
2007, the motivations of different types of owners to bias appraisals diverged clearly and 
temporarily provided a unique opportunity to assess potential appraisal bias.  We use appraisal-
based performance data for individual real estate assets to test whether there were significant 
ownership effects on performance during this period.  The results support the hypothesis that real 
estate appraisals in this period reflected the differing needs of clients. 
 
Keywords: Appraisal. Client Influence. Institutional Investors. Performance Measurement. Real 
Estate.  
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Introduction 
 
Over the last 15 years, a recurring theme from investment markets has been deep concern about 
the ethical standards of information intermediaries such as rating organisations, auditors and 
financial analysts.  The focus on this paper is on client pressure on appraisers in the commercial 
real estate investment sector.  Many real estate appraisers can tell vivid anecdotes about pressure 
from clients to adjust their appraisals.  Appraisers may alter their ostensibly independent 
estimates of Market Value in anticipation of clients’ adverse reactions.  Such moral hazard 
problems are endemic in many consumer and business services.  The examples of the ratings 
agencies before the sub-prime crisis and of equity analysts and auditing professionals during the 
equity/dot-com bubble before 2001 are some of the most notorious cases of how the quality of 
business services can be significantly impaired by a systemic breakdown in ethics. In these 
cases, the combination of personal and corporate incentives to maintain and generate additional 
income from clients and incentives for clients themselves to obtain biased advice coupled with 
limited regulatory oversight proved to be extremely problematic.  The experience of appraisals 
in commercial real estate markets has been much less dramatic.  However, it is still widely 
presumed that, given the existence of similar economic incentives for both clients and service 
providers (albeit with significant counter-incentives), the commercial real estate appraisal sector 
is prone to such problems.  
 
This paper investigates the extent to which clients were able to bias real estate appraisals used for 
investment performance measurement during the downturn in commercial real estate markets 
that began in the UK during the second half of 2007.  While it was an extreme event, the 
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2953-1 
 
associated liquidity and price shock in this period generated anecdotal speculation that different 
types of institutional real estate investors had incentives, and were attempting, to influence their 
appraisers in different directions.  Specifically, the requirement for open-ended real estate funds 
to meet high levels of demand for redemptions gave them strong incentives to ensure that their 
asset valuations were quickly marked (downwards) to market.  In contrast, it was suggested that 
other investors, such as REITs and closed-end funds, had incentives to resist falls in their asset 
valuations, e.g. to maintain share prices or to comply with banking covenants.  This divergence 
in incentives provides a unique opportunity to observe the extent to which the different 
motivations of clients led to different appraisal outcomes that, in turn, could be evidence of client 
influence.  
 
Background and Context 
 
In public financial asset markets, the price of an asset is usually observable and, hence, the 
estimation of selling price is not a critical exercise.  This is facilitated by the fact that, for any 
individual company or bond issue, thousands of trades in identical shares or bonds take place 
frequently and almost instantaneously.  In contrast, commercial real estate markets are private 
and decentralised and the constituent assets are far less frequently traded (Collett et al., 2003).  In 
this context, estimates of the likely selling price act as a proxy for actual prices and are important 
in guiding market participants.  Such estimates are supplied by real estate appraisers and are 
termed ‘Market Value’.  However, commercial real estate assets are heterogeneous, with varying 
location, legal and physical characteristics, which increases the difficulty of accurate estimation. 
As such, the record of real estate appraisers in regard to appraisal accuracy is varied.  Studies are 
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difficult to undertake owing to data constraints, but an RICS/Investment Property Databank 
study of sale prices and preceding real estate appraisals suggests that, in the UK, the average 
absolute variation from sale price was greater than 10% in the 12 years to 2011 (RICS/IPD, 
2013). 
 
Thus appraisals, as estimates of likely selling price, are subject to variability and it is this 
variation and lack of precision that makes them easy to criticize.  Nonetheless, they are required 
and commissioned for a number of purposes.  A substantial proportion of them are single, 
transaction-related appraisals in which the appraisal figure can be critical to the completion of 
the transaction.  Appraisals to support secured bank lending decisions fall into this category and 
have been the subject of scrutiny concerning whether lenders and borrowers or any other 
stakeholders in the process might want to influence the appraisal outcome (see, for example, 
Worzala et al., 1998; Levy and Schuck, 1999, 2005).  In these cases, pressure was normally 
applied to increase the value. 
 
However, there is also demand for periodic or repeated appraisals for investment performance 
measurement and for financial reporting. Listed property companies and REITS in the UK
1
 
require them for their accounts and analysts use them to interpret financial ratios and make 
buy/sell recommendations. Typically, performance measurement appraisals are used to measure 
the performance of an asset within a fund and also the performance of the fund manager; in 
many cases, the fund managers’ remuneration can be linked to an appraisal-based performance 
                                                 
1
 In common with most European property firms, and in contrast to US REITs, UK REITs and listed property 
companies follow IFRS and must report their real estate assets at fair value, not historic cost.  
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metric.  When remuneration is linked to investment performance that, in turn, is based on 
appraisals, there are obvious incentives for fund managers to attempt to bias the outcome.  
Appraisals are also used to set unit pricing for unlisted commercial real estate funds, such as 
property unit trusts and unit linked or insurance funds, where bid and ask prices are set on a net 
asset value basis.  As discussed in more detail below, accurate appraisals are particularly crucial 
to this type of fund manager to enable them to manage the fund fairly between existing, new and 
departing unit holders.  This can be more difficult to achieve in rapidly moving markets, 
especially when the demand to redeem units is high.  In addition to fund performance, the same 
appraisals can be used to assess whether investment funds or real estate companies that are 
levered are compliant with maximum loan-to-value ratios. 
 
In mature real estate markets, the requirements and conduct of appraisals are typically regulated 
by a blend of government legislation and professional institutions.  In the UK, the most 
important professional regulatory body is the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS).  
They produce guidance on professional standards for real estate appraisal.  The use of the RICS 
guidance is mandatory on Chartered Surveyors, who undertake virtually all regulated external
2
 
appraisals in the UK, including performance measurement appraisals.  RICS (2014) states that an 
appraiser must act independently and objectively at all times. 
 
Baum et al. (2000) investigated the appraisal process in the UK.  Drawing upon interviews with 
fund managers and appraisers, they found evidence of client pressure within a process that 
                                                 
2
 Appraisals may also be conducted ‘in-house’ by internal appraisers.  This paper is focused on ostensibly 
independent appraisals provided by external consultants. 
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provided fund managers with the means to influence appraisals.  This issue was explored by 
RICS who responded to Baum et al (2000) with a major investigation of appraisal practice in the 
UK, commissioning a report by the former Chair of the UK Office of Fair Trading, Sir Bryan 
Carsberg (RICS, 2002).  Rather than ban meetings to discuss draft appraisals which were, and 
still are, ingrained in the appraisal process, the RICS inserted a requirement in their appraisal 
standards for their members to keep records of such meetings noting that:   
 
“A threat to the member’s objectivity can arise where the outcome of a valuation is discussed before 
its completion with either the client or another party with an interest in the valuation. While such 
discussions are not improper, and indeed may be beneficial to both the member and the client, the 
member must be alert to the potential influence that such discussions may have on his or her 
fundamental duty to provide an objective opinion” (RICS, 2014, PS. 2, para 4.10) 
 
The Carsberg Report also recognised the notion of beneficial client influence in relation to 
communication between client and appraiser during the appraisal production process (RICS, 
2002: 22).  An example of beneficial client influence could be where clients assist the external 
appraiser by providing additional and better asset or market information that may not have been 
evident initially owing to the private nature of real estate markets.  This provides a justification 
for client intervention that was accepted by Carsberg.  It is also common for clients to check 
appraisals for errors or omissions.  Assuming that information provision by clients is not 
selective, this process should not lead to systematic bias of appraisal outcomes. However, not all 
client influence may be benign.  Crosby et al. (2010) characterised detrimental client influence as 
intervention by the client in the appraisal production process in order to bias appraisal outcomes.  
Whilst most studies have focussed on attempts to ‘ramp up’ appraisals above appraisers’ 
independent estimates of Market Value, clients may, in some circumstances, have incentives to 
bias appraisals downwards.  
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In the next part of the paper, we outline a conceptual model of the determinants of detrimental 
client influence in real estate appraisals.  It is suggested that the extent of such influence is 
contingent upon market and regulatory environments (ethical norms and legal and institutional 
frameworks), the salience of the appraisal(s) to the client, financial incentives for the appraiser to 
respond to client pressure, the level of moral reasoning of both client and appraiser and the 
degree of appraisal uncertainty.  We then discuss the UK commercial real estate market and the 
sharp falls in capital values of real estate investments that coincided with the global financial 
crisis.  After this, we introduce the data and econometric models that we use to test whether, all 
else equal, ownership had a significant effect on asset performance during this period.  The paper 
finishes by reporting the results of our empirical modelling before drawing conclusions. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Similar to auditors, accountants, equity and rating analysts, commercial real estate appraisers act 
as information intermediaries.  There is a large body of academic research on information 
intermediaries to suggest that their advice may not always be independent.  For equity analysts, 
much-cited papers by Lin and McNichols (1998) and Michaely and Womack (1999) found that 
analysts’ recommendations were affected by their firm’s business relationship with a company. 
Malmendier and Shantikumar (2005) investigated whether there were misaligned incentives 
when dealing with uninformed or small investors compared to informed or institutional 
investors.  They found that analysts affiliated to an investment bank made a strategic choice to 
distort recommendations to small investors, but not the earnings forecasts used by the 
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institutional investors.  It was concluded that analysts may have felt that the incentives to 
maintain favourable relationships with existing or potential corporate clients were outweighed 
by the disincentives of loss of credibility and reputation that could occur with “expert” investors.   
 
Another area of finance where client effects are argued to have influenced outcomes is in the 
credit rating business. Various explanations for the apparently optimistic ratings of securitisation 
tranches in light of subsequent downgrading and losses have been offered. These include “rating 
shopping”; the role of competition and pursuit of market share; and employment impacts from 
the close relationship between rating agencies and issuers. Furthermore, there was a strong 
concentration of issuers in asset backed securitisation in the period immediately before the credit 
crunch. It has been estimated that over 70% of US MBS issuance was written by just ten firms 
(Habinek et al., 2012).   As a result, client effects may have been pronounced.  
 
There is evidence of rating agencies producing biased ratings.  Benmelech and Dlugosh (2009a, 
2009b) find that tranches rated by only one firm were more prone to downgrades than tranches 
rated by more than one firm.  Ashcraft et al. (2010) find a similar result.  In a similar vein, 
Griffin and Tang (2011) look at qualitative ‘adjustments’ to the ratings of CDOs.  An adjustment 
was defined as the difference between the output from the pure quantitative model and the actual 
rating that was awarded.  They found that nearly 85% of adjustments were positive and that the 
amount of adjustment at the time of CDO issuance was positively related to future downgrades. 
Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro’s (2012) model of rating agencies’ behaviour cited many variables 
that also exist in the commercial real estate appraisal sector – payment by the ‘issuer’, limited 
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precision, the ability to make adjustments, the presence of reputational concerns and barriers to 
entry.   
 
In the auditing literature, independence is defined as the absence of collusion between the auditor 
and the manager of the client firm (Lee and Zhaoyang, 1998).  Problems can occur where there is 
“mutuality of interests” between auditor and client owing mainly to auditor economic 
dependence and/or the provision of non-auditing services by the auditing firm (see Zhang, 1999; 
Windsor and Ashkansay, 1995; Zimbelman and Waller, 1999).  DeAngelo (1981) first suggested 
that incumbent auditors could not be perfectly independent from their clients, who are able to 
impose costs by switching.  Empirical research suggests evidence of shifting and contingent 
influence.  For instance, Khurana and Raman (2006) find that higher audit fees are positively 
associated with the cost of equity.  However, studies have also found evidence of 
counterincentives to mitigate the potential agency costs associated with economic dependence.  
Reynolds and Francis (2000) and Gaver and Paterson (2007) found that, consistent with potential 
large costs of lawsuits, the Big Five US audit firms tend to be more conservative in auditing 
larger firms. 
 
In the real estate literature, there is an established body of work that has identified different types 
of influence (coercive, covert, reward, information) on different categories of appraisal 
(transactional, periodic) at different stages of the process (instruction, information collection, 
calculation, reporting, etc.).  The vast majority of existing research has been either quasi-
experimental (see Kinnard, et al., 1997; Diaz III and Hansz, 1997; Hansz and Diaz III, 2001; 
Hansz, 2004; Amidu and Aluko, 2007a; Amidu et al., 2008) or interview and/or survey-based 
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(see Smolen and Hambleton, 1997; Worzala et al., 1998; Gallimore and Wolverton, 2000; Yu, 
2002; McAllister et al., 2003; Crosby et al., 2004; Levy and Schuck, 2005; Amidu and Aluko, 
2007b; Nwuba et al., 2015).   
 
Given the reputational and possibly criminal issues involved, it is clear that there may be 
problems of self-report bias in interview and questionnaire-based studies.  Hence, while this 
existing body of research provides indications of the possible drivers and appraiser responses to 
pressure from clients, it is relatively undeveloped compared to the work on auditor 
independence.  There remains considerable scope for research on how detrimental client 
influence varies with the purpose of the appraisal, client, appraiser and asset and market 
conditions.  It is possible that in interviews or questionnaire responses, appraisers may anchor on 
atypical or one-off incidents.   There is still little evidence on the extent to which such pressure 
tends to be sporadic or endemic and temporary or permanent. 
 
A stylized fact that emerges from this body of work is that clients attempt to influence appraisal 
outcomes and that appraisers are likely to respond to client pressure.  However, two studies have 
special significance for this paper.  Although primarily interview based, the study by McAllister 
et al. (2003) found that periodic monthly appraisals were treated somewhat differently from 
annual or even quarterly revaluations.  Appraisers admitted to not giving monthly appraisals the 
same degree of attention as annual or quarterly appraisals, while analysis of UK data on periodic 
appraisals found that the majority remained unchanged from month to month.  McAllister et al. 
(2003) also identified issues with market state and appraisers’ ability to identify price changes in 
markets in some sort of crisis.  Real estate markets had a major reduction in trading in the period 
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of the Russian Debt Crisis.  Appraisers reacted by keeping over 80% of monthly appraisals 
unchanged in October 1998 against a longer term average of 69%.  This gives some indication of 
what might have been expected to happen in the 2007 crisis.  McAllister et al. (2003) also 
identified the process by which appraisals were negotiated between client and appraiser at a draft 
stage, providing the means to influence them. 
 
Meanwhile, Crosby et al. (2010) used the 2007/08 financial crisis to identify whether type of 
owner had an effect on the movement of real estate values in the UK during the downturn in a 
rare quantitative study of client influence.  They hypothesised that certain types of owners would 
have an interest in moving appraisals up in relative terms while others would have an interest in 
moving them down even further.  They found that, in the aftermath of a run on open ended real 
estate funds in the second half of 2007 (in particular, the last quarter of 2007 when redemptions 
peaked at over £1.6 billion) valuations of their portfolios fell more than those of portfolios 
owned by pension funds and property companies.  This was despite the fact that these open 
ended funds were appraised monthly, where, according to McAllister et al. (2003), most 
appraisals do not move month to month and the number of appraisals not moving increases when 
markets are in crisis.  However, the Crosby et al. (2010) study could not obtain access to 
individual asset data, so could only undertake analysis at a highly aggregated, fund type level 
leading to concerns that the results might be affected by differential quality of portfolios between 
investor types.  The present paper builds on this earlier work by developing the conceptual 
framework and by examining individual asset appraisals during the UK commercial real estate 
crash from 2007 to 2009. 
 
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2953-1 
 
Client Influence: A Conceptual Model 
 
Levy and Schuck (1999) outlined a preliminary framework to describe the key variables that 
might determine the extent of client influence or bias on real estate appraisals.  While no explicit 
connection was made, their framework echoed (albeit less formally) Trevino’s (1986) 
interactionist model of ethical factors in organisational decision-making.  Levy and Schuck’s 
model identified four main categories of factors (individual and organisational characteristics, 
external characteristics, client characteristics and service characteristics) that determine the 
amount and type of power and, therefore, influence.  A range of characteristics were outlined in 
each category.  The conceptual model presented here in Figure 1 represents the extent of 
detrimental client influence as a product of the balance of effects from a range of internal and 
external variables on both clients and appraisals.  It was produced through an iterative process 
informed by the authors’ tacit and explicit knowledge obtained from their current and previous 
research in this area.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
From the client perspective, the salience of the appraisal is a key situational factor determining 
the extent of their motivation to attempt to influence the appraisal.  The relative importance of 
appraisals to clients can vary substantially among clients and over time.  In certain 
circumstances, ‘adverse’ appraisals can result in aborted transactions, lower than expected 
remuneration and fund insolvency.  In contrast, for many corporate organisations, while their real 
estate holdings are a key factor of production, the value of the real estate can be of limited 
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importance to their financial performance.  The incentives and counterincentives for clients to 
apply pressure on appraisers to deviate from their independent estimates of value are contingent 
on the relative costs and benefits of applying such pressure.  In addition, the degree of client 
knowledge regarding the asset and the appraisal process will affect their ability to contest 
appraisals. 
 
The incentives and counterincentives for the individual appraiser to respond to pressure from 
clients and to deviate from their independent estimates of value are, in turn, contingent on the 
relative costs and benefits of yielding to client pressure.  An over-arching agency problem is that 
the appraiser (and/or their firm) can have a conflict of interest between their own self-interest 
and a professional obligation to provide independent appraisals. There can be a complex range of 
incentives and counterincentives for appraisers who are trying to balance losses due to 
reputational damage and potential litigation risk against revenue losses caused by loss of client. 
 
Situational drivers, such as economic dependence, are refracted through individual fund 
managers (clients) and appraisers.  Internal or dispositional factors then become determinants of 
the outcome of the ‘negotiation’ process.   In the auditing literature, the main focus has been on 
variations in the level of moral reasoning among individuals (see Trevino, 1986).  In an auditing 
context, Windsor and Ashkansay (1995) identify three categories of individual – autonomous, 
pragmatic and accommodating – who, it is proposed, respond in different ways to client pressure.  
In addition, individual behaviour will be affected by the core values of their employer’s 
organisational culture (see Schein, 1984).  In turn, individuals and firms exist within a wider 
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business culture and it is generally acknowledged that different markets and cultures have 
different rules and expectations regarding ethical standards (Ahmed et al., 2003). 
 
A key enabler of client pressure and influence is the intrinsic uncertainty in real estate appraisals.  
For most commercial real estate assets, the appraisal process relies upon the analysis of historical 
transactions.  It is widely recognised that there are a number of inherent limitations.  First, the 
reliability of a transaction price signal decays in proportion to the quantity of exogenous market 
movements.  Put simply, the more the market changes in the period between the transaction and 
the appraisal, the less reliable will be evidence from the transaction.  Second, transactions are 
‘noisy’ due to the individual characteristics of assets, buyers and sellers (as in Quan and Quigley, 
1991).  Whilst the first problem is unavoidable, the ‘signal to noise’ problem is mitigated in 
active markets which generate substantial price information.  However, thin trading in real estate 
markets typically results in poor information flows, which vary over time and among market 
segments.   
 
In deteriorating or weak market conditions, these inherent sources of appraisal uncertainty can 
shift from a chronic to an acute state.  In a downturn, trading volumes can fall dramatically and 
appraisers can find themselves with little transaction evidence upon which to estimate the size of 
the change in values that has occurred.  However, whatever the market state, there is scope for a 
range of interpretations by market participants of a pricing signal.  This is because, relative to the 
asset being appraised, the prior transaction took place in different market conditions, involved a 
different asset and was generated by the interaction of unique buyers and sellers.  These factors 
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heighten appraisal uncertainty and appraisal variation
3
 and, most significantly in this context, 
provide a valid basis for appraisals to be contested.  This has been explicitly acknowledged in 
professional standards where it is stated that appraisals undertaken in the wake of or during  
 
“unforeseen financial, macro-economic, legal, political or even natural events…there may be a reduced 
level of certainty that can be attached to a valuation, due to inconsistent, or an absence of, empirical data, 
or the valuer being faced with an unprecedented set of circumstances on which to base a judgment. In 
such situations, demands placed on the valuer can be unusually testing. Although valuers should remain 
able to make a judgment, it is important that the context of that judgment is clearly expressed.”  (RICS, 
2014, VPGA 9, para 2.6) 
 
As in the capital markets and the real economy, the fall in real estate values across 2007 and 
2008 can be characterised as an extreme event for the UK commercial real estate market.  For a 
number of clients, the consequences of the downturn threatened their economic existence and 
increased incentives for fund managers to apply pressure to appraisers and for appraisers to 
respond to such pressures.   
 
The Market Context 
 
Since 2002, the UK commercial real estate market has experienced a major boom and slump, 
followed by recovery. Between February 2002 and June 2007, the IPD UK monthly capital 
growth index
4
 rose for 65 consecutive months. Over that period, capital values increased by 
53%, 8.2% per annum in nominal terms and 4.6% per annum in real terms. Capital values then 
started to fall in July 2007 and by July 2009 the IPD monthly index had fallen for 25 consecutive 
                                                 
3
 That is disagreement between appraisers on the value of the same property. 
4
 IPD is part of MSCI and is the leading provider of real estate investment performance benchmarks in the UK and 
in many other international real estate markets. 
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2953-1 
 
months. Capital values fell by approximately 12% in the second half of 2007 and by more than a 
third from their peak in June 2007 to the end of 2008, with the steepest falls during Q4 2007 and 
Q4 2008. At the same time, appraisers were faced with greater uncertainty since, as a 
consequence of the falling markets, transaction volumes fell markedly.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The rapid change in market conditions in 2007 caused a range of problems for real estate 
investors and fund managers. Crucially, the nature and severity of the problems varied across 
client types. Open ended funds faced particular difficulties, especially unit trusts with defined 
redemption policies based on the last published net asset value (NAV).  Redemptions rose from 
around £300 million in Quarter 1 2007 to £600 million in Quarter 2, to over £900 million in the 
three months to September 2007 before peaking in Quarter 4 2007 at £1.65 billion. In 2008 
redemptions fell back but still averaged around £750 million per quarter.  It was only in Quarter 
3, 2009 that redemptions fell back to their pre-financial crisis levels (Crosby et al., 2010).   
 
For those open-ended funds without strong cash reserves, redemptions could only be made 
through asset sales in a market that was experiencing sharp falls in values and liquidity.  Unless 
asset values were marked to market accurately, exiting investors would receive payments above 
liquidation value to the detriment of remaining investors.  Faced with such problems, most open-
ended funds had few options.  Many could not ‘freeze’ redemptions and seeking new capital was 
not feasible.  Whilst they could widen bid-ask spreads, a key priority was to ensure that their 
appraisal-based unit prices were as accurate as possible.  It is notable that the most of the open 
criticism of appraisers reported in practitioner journals was from open ended fund managers 
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complaining that appraisals had not fallen quickly enough (for examples, see EG Capital, 2008 
and IPE Real Estate, 2009).   
 
In contrast, other types of owner faced different pressures.  For closed-end funds, property 
companies and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) that were leveraged, sharp falls in 
appraised capital values created the risk of breaching loan-to-value covenants with their lenders. 
Finally, fund managers whose remuneration included a performance component – the beating of 
an absolute or relative benchmark target – again had incentives to resist sharp downward 
movements in appraisals.  
 
Drawing upon the existing research outlined above, our underlying analytical framework is that 
there is regular negotiation between clients and appraisers about periodic appraisals, with a 
complex range of incentives and counter-incentives varying among clients and appraisers to bias 
appraisals.  However, the primary effect of client influence in the specific set of market 
conditions investigated is expected to be on the timing of the change in appraisal rather than the 
extent of it.  Essentially, when there is a noisy price signal suggesting a shift in values, appraisers 
and clients have different propensities to update appraisals to incorporate that signal owing to 
differences in prior beliefs and incentives.  Clients who believe that there is a high probability 
that the signal is correct or have incentives to accept its accuracy and are more likely to pressure 
their appraisers to incorporate it into their appraisals.  On the other hand, clients who believe that 
there is a low probability that the signal is correct or incentives to doubt or reject its accuracy are 
more likely to pressure their appraisers not to incorporate it into their appraisals.  However, if the 
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signal is proven to be reliable, it is expected that the latter group will accept eventually that 
prices have changed, producing a Bayesian-style convergence to agreement.   
 
This suggests that there should be little long term difference in performance between owner 
types due to owner influence on appraisals. Instead, it is the timing of recorded performance that 
will differ.  For example, taking a highly simplified scenario, assume that a noisy price signal 
arrives suggesting that values have risen by 10%.  The appraiser is uncertain about whether to 
factor this signal into their appraisals.  In Period 0, Owner A believes that there is a high 
probability (or has incentives to believe) that this signal is correct and pressures the appraiser to 
incorporate the information.  Owner B, in contrast, believes that there is a low probability that 
this signal is correct (or has incentives to reject the new information) and pressures the appraiser 
not to incorporate the information.  As a result, Owner A has a better performance than Owner B 
in Period 0.   However, in the next period (Period 1), new information arrives that supports the 
beliefs of Owner A and Owner B now has to accept that there has been a pricing shift.  All else 
equal, in Period 1 Owner B now achieves a better performance than Owner A, as the appraisals 
for their assets adjust upwards.  Thus, over the two periods, their performance should be identical 
despite short-term client influence. 
 
The period of the global financial crisis created the context for a natural experiment to test client 
influences on appraisals. During this period, the incentives for different types of clients to bias 
appraisals diverged dramatically and temporarily.  This generated strong prior expectations about 
the way that appraisals of assets owned by different owners would behave and anecdotal 
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evidence suggesting that this type of client pressure was occurring.   The data and modelling 
strategy used to test these expectations are described in the next two sections. 
 
Data 
 
The data used in this study relate to individual assets for which information is recorded in the 
databases of IPD. This information is supplied by major real estate investors for the purpose of 
receiving performance measurement and benchmarking services. These include insurance 
companies, pension funds, open-ended funds, closed-end funds and REITs.  The coverage by 
IPD of institutional investment in UK real estate is good, but not complete. Recent estimates 
suggest that their indexes currently cover around 40% of the investment market in UK real estate 
(see Mitchell, 2014; Teuben and Clacy-Jones, 2015). One issue is that their database focuses on 
domestic investors only and a growing proportion of UK investment-grade real estate is now 
held by overseas investors, particularly in the case of Central London (see Lizieri et al., 2011). 
There is also little or no coverage of private property companies or private investors. 
 
The study draws, in particular, on appraisals supplied for properties that are part of the IPD UK 
Quarterly Property Index. As at December 2014, this comprised 9,747 properties held by 229 
separate funds and with a total value of more than £140 billion (IPD, 2015). Although IPD 
produces an index based on assets appraised at a monthly frequency, the quarterly index has a 
much greater number of assets and a greater mix of owners for testing the hypotheses put 
forward in this study. 
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The dataset consisted of observations for 10,979 individual commercial properties that produced 
capital return figures for at least one quarter during Q3 2007 to Q2 2009. The study period was 
defined with reference to market indices, discussed earlier, that identify the end of the UK 
commercial real estate boom as occurring in 2007 and the trough in values being reached in Q2 
2009. Therefore, the dataset spans the entire period of prolonged decline in capital values in this 
market. The sample primarily consists of office, retail and industrial buildings, reflecting the 
nature of the UK real estate investment market where residential properties do not play a major 
part in institutional portfolios. Panel data were available on the capital value, rental value, capital 
expenditure and yield (capitalization rate) of each property and descriptive fields for property 
type, region and tenure were also present.
5
 
 
Essential fields for this study are information on ownership and measures of how values have 
changed. Details of identity, address and specific owner were not incorporated in the dataset to 
preserve confidentiality, but type of owner, as defined by IPD, was supplied. The types are fairly 
broad, comprising insurance company, pension fund, unit-linked fund, listed property company 
or REIT, open-ended fund, closed-end fund, and other. Additional information about each owner 
such as size or leverage were not provided to avoid inadvertent identification, but this represents 
a limitation because, within owner types, pressures and motives for influencing appraisals could 
vary with these characteristics. Similarly, details about the identity and nature of the companies 
producing appraisals were not available. 
 
                                                 
5
 The IPD databases also contain information on leasing and building vacancy, but these data were not made 
available for the period studied here. 
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The number of observations in each quarter by type of owner is shown in Table 1. The sample 
reduces between the start and end of the period as assets are sold or when funds leave the IPD 
service.  Open-ended funds are the largest group in terms of the number of properties.
6
 The 
second largest type is unit linked funds. These are funds that typically attract money from 
defined contribution pension plans and from which money may be withdrawn and redirected into 
other types of investment such as equities or bonds. Thus, they share important characteristics 
with open-ended funds. Self-administered pension funds are the third largest group while 
insurance companies refers to assets held in the life funds of such companies rather than total 
assets under management, which may include assets in unit linked or open ended funds that they 
administer. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The capital growth of each asset from quarter to quarter will be driven largely by changes to the 
capital value, as judged by the appraiser, over that interval. However, IPD also adjust for any 
capital expenditure in that period so that reported capital growth approximates the effect of 
market conditions on the value of that asset during the period. The formula used by IPD (2014) 
to calculate a single period capital return is as follows: 
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 They are also the largest owner group on a value-weighted basis. When values are taken into account, listed 
companies and REITs are more important and unit-linked funds are less important. 
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where CR is the capital return during quarter t, CV is the capital value at the end of a quarter, CX 
relates to capital expenditure in that quarter and CI relates to capital receipts received over that 
quarter. 
 
Quarterly rental value growth and yield impact figures were also available in the dataset. The 
former captures the change in rental value from period to period. Rental value growth may not 
result in a change to current rental income, as the actual rent is usually fixed by the terms of the 
lease contracts in place.  However, it represents a potential source of future change in income 
and so influences capital value estimates.  Yield impact measures the effect on capital value of 
changes in an asset’s equivalent yield.7  For example, if the yield for a property moved from 6% 
to 7%, the impact on its capital value would be negative (capital growth would be -14.29% in 
this example). More formally, it is computed by IPD as: 
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Where YI refers to yield impact and Y refers to the yield level at time t or t-1. The reason for 
including these additional measures is to better understand the means by which appraisals might 
be adjusted under the influence of client pressure.   It may be that estimates of rental value and 
the yields applied to those estimates are influenced or that one is more likely to be influenced 
                                                 
7
 Equivalent yield is a form of capitalisation rate that is commonly used in the UK and which reflects current rental 
income and a future reversion to the current level of rental value.  It essentially acts in the same way as an income 
multiplier.  It is a key assumption in the appraisal process and is usually based on analysis of transactions involving 
comparable assets. A change in yield typically reflects a change in the pricing of an asset as market conditions 
change. 
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2953-1 
 
than the other.  It is expected that changes to appraisals are easier to achieve through yield 
adjustments.  As a high proportion of rent tends to be contractually fixed, implausible shifts to 
appraised rental values would often be required to produce decrease in capital value of 5%-10%.  
However, such changes in the appraisal could be achieved by changing the yield from, say, 4.5% 
to 4.75% or 5.00%.  Furthermore, rental transactions are typically more frequent and so 
supporting evidence for the rental part of the appraisal may be greater in many cases. 
 
The Econometric Model 
 
Hedonic regression modeling is a standard methodology for examining price or value 
determinants in real estate research. We use this method in our study primarily to isolate the 
effect of type of owner.  The quintessential log-linear hedonic model takes the following form: 
 
ln CVi = α+ βxi + ϕZi + εi        (3) 
 
where CVi is the capital value for a given building (often expressed on a per square metre basis), 
xi is a vector of several explanatory locational, lease and physical characteristics, Zi is a vector of 
time-related variables and β and φ are the respective vectors of parameters to be estimated.  is a 
random error and stochastic disturbance term that is expected to take the form of a normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of . The hedonic weights assigned to each 
variable are equivalent to this characteristic’s overall contribution to the value or price (Rosen, 
1974). An alternative specification, appropriate for the tests performed in this paper would be to 
model not the capital value itself but the periodic change in capital value: 
i
e
2
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δ CVi = α+ βxi + ϕZi + εi        (4) 
 
A summary specification of the econometric model of capital growth rates is as follows: 
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CapGrowth is the dependent variable and represents the percentage change in the property’s 
value, computed in the manner shown by equation (1). Meanwhile, PASCapGr represents the 
percentage change in the capital growth index in that quarter for the IPD Portfolio Analysis 
Service (PAS) segment to which each asset belongs.  These segments distinguish different parts 
of the UK real estate investment market at a broad level.  For example, retail assets are classified 
into four segments based on type and geography, office assets into four segments based on 
geography and industrial assets into two segments based on geography.  Hence, this variable 
should capture general trends in the part of the real estate market that is relevant to each asset 
and it is expected that this variable will be the most important determinant of an individual 
asset’s capital growth in any given quarter. 
 
InCapVal represents the capital value of the property as at the end of Q2 2007.  This is included 
to control for the effects of lot size on value, as higher value assets may exhibit different 
performance trends to lower value assets.  ExcessYield represents the difference between the 
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equivalent yield of the property and the equivalent yield reported for its PAS segment as at the 
end of Q2 2007.  This is a portmanteau variable that attempts to control for unobserved factors 
that create differences in the quality of assets due to, inter alia, variations in unexpired lease 
terms, tenant covenant strength and age of the building. A low yield relative to the segment 
average may indicate an asset that is considered to be prime in nature and such assets may 
exhibit different performance to those with higher yields in that segment.  Both of these variables 
are kept at their Q2 2007 values in all models so that they are independent of subsequent changes 
in capital growth. 
 
Sold is a dummy variable that is set to one where an asset has been sold in the following quarter.  
Given the stylised fact that real estate appraisals lag actual market prices (see Geltner et al., 
2003), it is expected that, for properties that are in the process of being sold and where the price 
is agreed, the appraisal will be lower (higher) in a falling (rising) market than it otherwise would 
be, as knowledge of the price is reflected in the estimate of value. Hence, the expected sign of 
the coefficient should vary with market conditions.  Finally, OwnerDum represents a set of 
dummy variables that are set to one where a property is held by an owner of that particular type 
and zero otherwise. As noted earlier, there are seven categories of owner: insurance company, 
pension fund, unit-linked fund, listed property company or REIT, open-ended fund, closed-end 
fund, and other.  The expected coefficient is dependent upon which category is omitted and the 
quarter in which the model is estimated.  We use insurance companies as the hold-out category 
since they have tended to track the IPD index most closely.
8
  We focus particularly on the fourth 
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 This was determined by comparing the tracking error for the aggregate performance of all assets held by each 
owner type over the period Q2 2007 to Q2 2009. 
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quarter of 2007 as this is the period when the conflicting motivations of different types of owners 
to bias appraisals were reported. 
 
We analyse cross-sectional variations in capital growth between individual properties for each 
quarter in the period Q3 2007 to Q2 2009. Various functional forms for the models were tested 
and a standard least squares regression appeared most satisfactory. However, we detect 
heteroskedasticity, so robust standard errors are used where the assumption of independence in 
errors has been relaxed in regard to assets owned by the same fund.  This is because assets in the 
same fund may be subject to fund-specific factors that are unobserved and distinct from a general 
owner-type effect.  We also estimate models using either rental value growth or yield impact as 
the dependent variable given their role in shaping capital growth.  Note that these models adopt 
the same specification to equation (5) except for the different dependent variable and that the 
PAS variable is amended to rental value growth or yield impact, as appropriate. 
 
In examining the capital growth, rental value growth, equivalent yield and yield impact statistics, 
it was evident that there were a small number of extreme values or outliers, particularly in the 
positive tail. We considered excluding these, but had no a priori basis for so doing. Instead, we 
applied a Winsorizing process to the variables at the 0.5% and 99.5% tails. The results from the 
Winsorized models generally outperformed the untransformed models, based on AIC and 
Bayesian information criteria, although there were no major shifts in the variable coefficients in 
terms of either sign or magnitude. We tested for multi-collinearity examining correlations 
between independent variables and by examining variance inflation factors: no problems 
requiring model adjustment were encountered.  
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Results 
 
Table 2 shows the output of the models for the particular quarter of interest, Q4 2007, when 
values fell steeply and redemption pressures on open-ended funds were at their greatest. The 
table shows results for models of capital growth as well as rental growth and yield impact, the 
latter being that element of capital growth resulting from yield change.  Meanwhile, the results 
for each quarter starting at the third quarter of 2007 and ending in the second quarter of 2009 are 
reported in the Appendix Tables A1-A3.  As is common in cross-sectional studies of return rates, 
the R
2 
is comparatively low in each case, though, interestingly, the explanatory power improves 
substantially for Q4 2007 compared to other quarters.  However, the F-statistics indicate that the 
models are highly significant in all cases, as are the control variables.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Focusing first on capital growth, Table 2 and Table A1 shows that segment capital return was, as 
expected, a highly significant determinant of asset capital growth rates.  Referring to Table A1, 
for most of the period, there is a negative relationship between lot size and capital return.  Higher 
value assets appear to have had worse performance than lower value assets after controlling for 
segment returns.  Our excess yield variable is also statistically significant in most quarters.  
However, the relationship between capital growth and yields is often non-linear and we use a 
spline to capture variations in behaviour – with yields that are high relative to their segment 
being captured by one variable and yields that are low relative to their segment captured by 
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another.
9
  For the first six quarters, the sign on excess equivalent yield for assets with higher than 
average yields is positive.  This suggests that the capital values of higher yielding (lower quality) 
buildings fell less quickly than those of lower yielding (higher quality) buildings.  However, in 
the last five quarters of the period, a negative coefficient where yields are below average 
suggests that, in these quarters, lower yielding buildings fell less quickly than their counterparts.  
There are also three quarters where both effects are in evidence.  Use of the spline helps to 
capture this complex relationship with the control variable. 
 
In Table 2 it is apparent that, in the market turmoil towards the end of 2007, assets that were sold 
in the next quarter had lower capital growth than unsold properties.  This is in line with the 
expectation that actual prices would be lower than appraisal estimates in a period of falling 
values and that the appraisals of assets being sold would reflect information about these lower 
prices.  In Table A1, it can be seen that the opposite effect is evident in the final quarter of our 
period, Q2 2009, which was the last quarter before values started to rise again.  Both of these 
results are consistent with the stylized fact that appraisals tend to lag actual prices (see Geltner et 
al., 2003 and Fisher et al., 2003). 
 
Turning to the impact of fund type on capital returns, we find that, for the final quarter of 2007, 
the results are in line with prior expectations.  There are some statistically significant ownership 
effects in other quarters, but, unlike for the final quarter of 2007, we have no strong a priori 
expectations about the timing and direction of such effects.  The results in Table 2 suggest that, 
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 These are continuous variables that take either the value of the excess yield where this is above (below) the 
segment average and zero otherwise. 
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compared to ownership by an insurance company, ownership by a pension fund had no 
statistically significant effect on capital returns.  Meanwhile, the coefficient for listed REITs and 
property companies has the expected positive sign, but is not statistically significant.  In other 
words, we cannot reject the possibility that movements in appraisals were the same for these 
three groups of investors after controlling for factors such as segment, asset size and yield. 
 
In contrast, compared to ownership by an insurance company, ownership by a closed-end fund 
had a statistically significant and positive effect on capital returns in the final quarter of 2007.  
This is consistent with anecdotal reports of the problems that such closed-end funds were having 
in complying with minimum loan-to-value lending covenants.  Indeed, the effect of closed-end 
fund ownership is particularly striking.  With controls for segment type and asset quality, assets 
owned by closed-end funds recorded falls in value of approximately 2% less in the final quarter 
of 2007 than assets owned by insurance companies.  For open-ended funds and unit-linked fund, 
the ownership effects are the opposite.  Consistent with anecdotal reports that these investment 
vehicles were concerned about appraisals failing to respond quickly to deteriorating market 
conditions, assets owned by open-ended funds and unit-linked funds had lower capital returns 
than the hold-out category.  The coefficients concerned are statistically significant and suggest 
that, all else equal, their assets recorded falls in value of approximately 1% more than assets 
owned by insurance companies in the final quarter of 2007.   
 
Table 2 also includes the results of models where rental value growth and the yield impact are 
the dependent variables.  It is expected that downward value adjustments attributable to owner 
type would occur through influencing the yield rather than the rental values.   Once again, the 
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results are consistent with those expectations.  There are no statistically significant ownership 
effects on rental value growth.  In contrast, the results for yield impact are similar to the findings 
for capital return.  For open-ended and unit-linked funds, the impact is both statistically 
significant and negative, suggesting that yield adjustments for properties held by these funds 
were different to those where insurance companies were the owners, even after controls for 
segment, asset size and yield level are put in place.  Meanwhile, for closed ended funds, the 
ownership effect is significant and positive. 
 
Finally, for ease of reference, we summarise in Table 3 the instances where movements that are 
associated with owner type were found to be statistically significant.  We focus on unit-linked 
funds, open-ended funds and closed-end funds as those groups with perhaps the clearest motives 
for client influence as well as the clearest findings.  As discussed, the results in Q4 2007 fit our 
expectations, but we do not subsequently observe any counter-adjustments to produce the long-
run convergence suggested earlier in the paper.  However, it could be that continued economic 
uncertainty and new events confound observation of such a process or that such readjustments 
are more gradual and are not detected by our models. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Conclusion 
 
Real estate appraisals are of key importance to the operation of commercial real estate 
investment markets.  They are used in performance measurement, financial reporting, monitoring 
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of loan covenants and the unit pricing of pooled vehicles inter alia. There is a well-established 
body of empirical evidence to suggest that the clients often have the means (domain and market 
knowledge, intrinsic appraisal uncertainty), motives (remuneration, loan covenants, fund 
redemption obligations) and opportunities (draft valuation meetings and other forms of client 
consultation) to bias appraisals.  In turn, appraisers often have the means (intrinsic appraisal 
uncertainty), motive (economic dependence) and opportunities to bias their appraisals in 
response to or in anticipation of client pressure.  However, the extent of such influence is likely 
to be contingent.  Key variables will be the incentives and counterincentives for clients and 
appraisers to exert or respond to pressure, individual moral reasoning, the organisation and 
broader business culture, the strength of the regulatory regime, market conditions and the extent 
of intrinsic appraisal uncertainty.  
 
The potential of client influence to bias ostensibly independent real estate appraisals is examined 
using the unique opportunity afforded by the market downturn commencing in 2007 in the UK. 
This forms a natural experiment in that the motivations of different types of owners to bias 
appraisals diverged clearly and temporarily.  In a period when transaction evidence about the 
extent of changes in market prices was difficult to obtain, there was what came to be labelled as 
abnormal uncertainty about the extent of the shift in market conditions and prices.  Open-ended 
funds, faced with redemption pressures, had an interest in ensuring that appraisals responded 
quickly to rapidly deteriorating market conditions.  In contrast, often heavily levered closed-end 
funds with loan-to-value covenant issues had an interest in a ‘wait and see’ approach, an 
approach that had been identified with the much more minor Russian Debt crisis, resulting in few 
monthly valuation movements as identified in McAllister et al. (2003). 
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The results presented here are consistent with the idea that the appraisals in this period reflected 
the differing needs of clients and strengthen the aggregate level data analysis of Crosby et al. 
(2010). Controlling for asset characteristics and market segment, there appear to be statistically 
and economically significant client effects.  In the specific quarter (Q4 2007) in which there was 
substantial market gossip about the conflicting pressures on appraisers to adjust (or not) their 
appraisals, we find that asset values fell more quickly for types of funds with incentives to ensure 
that their appraisals quickly reflected deteriorating market conditions.  In turn, the appraised 
values of funds with incentives to ensure that those values did not fall tended to achieve higher 
capital returns than other investors in our sample.  The results from the current study reflect a 
specific set of circumstances which are consistent with the general framework proposed in our 
conceptual model.  The key variable in these specific circumstances was appraisal salience.  The 
results were consistent with variations in appraisal salience (in this case, incentivising different 
client types to apply pressure in different directions) affecting the appraisal outcomes.  
 
It is challenging to assess whether the results represent relatively strong but unique client 
influence effects in turbulent market conditions or endemic client behaviour.  In addition, it can 
be difficult to generalise about the pressures and incentives on owners and/or proxy owners such 
as fund managers.  Such pressures and incentives will vary with market conditions and the 
timing of appraisals.  There is also heterogeneity of circumstances such as size, gearing and 
remuneration models within, as well as between, owner categories.  For example, open-ended 
fund managers may have had conflicting pressures and incentives to meet redemption 
requirements, comply with loan covenants and meet bonus-related targets.  Furthermore, the 
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attributes of appraisers (firm and individual) could be important in their ability to withstand such 
pressures.  The absence of further details about owners and appraisers represents a limitation in 
our findings that future research may be able to address. 
 
However, given the moral and professional disapproval associated with unethical behaviour in 
business, in addition to potential loss of employment or even criminal prosecution, unethical 
practices may not be recorded in field studies.  Yet should appraisal bias be a surprise when real 
estate appraisals intrinsically are subject to an element of subjectivity and uncertainty, when 
appraisers are to some degree economically dependent on their clients and when their clients can 
have incentives, power and knowledge to bias appraisals?  The quality of governance of the 
appraisal process is at the core of this issue.  The UK is one of the most mature and transparent 
commercial real estate markets in which the behaviour of appraisers is closely monitored by 
professional bodies.  In less mature and transparent real estate markets, where the appraisal 
profession is often not so well-developed, we suggest that it is more likely that appraisals could 
be biased by undesirable and potentially systematic client influence.  Consequently, this raises 
wider concerns about the quality of real estate performance measures and other financial 
information that is appraisal based. 
 
Appendix 
 
INSERT TABLES A1-A3 HERE 
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Figure 2: UK Commercial Real Estate Capital Growth Index, 2002-2012 
 
Source: Investment Property Databank UK Monthly Index (rebased) 
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Table 1: Sample size by owner type and period 
 
 Q2 
2007 
Q3 
2007 
Q4 
2007 
Q1 
2008 
Q2 
2008 
Q3 
2008 
Q4 
2008 
Q1 
2009 
Q2 
2009 
Insurance companies 723 713 686 660 644 631 620 612 604 
Pension funds 1,569 1,589 1,489 1,488 1,488 1,405 1,397 1,376 1,366 
Unit linked funds 2,144 2,230 1,773 1,609 1,512 1,231 1,043 1,089 1,006 
Open ended funds 2,755 2,814 2,659 2,440 2,403 2,268 2,180 2,173 2,117 
Listed property 
companies & REITs 636 676 664 598 579 565 547 470 447 
Closed end funds 269 261 258 222 219 220 219 146 149 
Other 427 335 325 319 310 302 302 304 297 
Total 8,523 8,618 7,854 7,336 7,155 6,622 6,308 6,170 5,986 
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Table 2: The Determinants of Asset Investment Performance in Quarter 4, 2007 
 
  
Dependent 
Variables 
 
 Capital Rental Yield 
Independent variables Growth Growth Impact 
Segment capital growth 0.841*** 0.986*** 0.933*** 
(Log) Capital value -0.477*** 0.026 -0.351*** 
Excess yield (+) 1.254*** -0.098** 1.733*** 
Excess yield (-) 0.060 0.037 0.229 
Sold next quarter -1.713** -0.240 -1.597** 
Insurance company Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out 
Pension fund -0.089 0.019 0.092 
Unit-linked fund -1.073** -0.032 -0.788* 
Open-ended fund -1.075** -0.131 -0.818* 
Listed property co 0.827 -0.014 1.046 
Closed-end fund 1.921* 0.466 1.818* 
Other owner type -0.379 -0.016 -0.223 
Constant 6.691*** -0.388 4.923*** 
Adjusted R
2 0.201 0.051 0.202 
F-statistic 22.58 15.39 26.84 
Probability F = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No of observations 7,849 7,849 7,849 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Table 3: Movements Associated with Type of Owner in Cases where Coefficients are Statistically Significant 
 
 2007Q3 2007Q4 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 
Capital growth         
Unit-linked fund + –     –   
Open-ended fund  –   –    
Closed-end fund  + +      
Yield impact         
Unit-linked fund + –       
Open-ended fund  –       
Closed-end fund  + +      
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Appendix Table A1: Capital growth regression results 
 
 Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter 
 2007Q3 2007Q4 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 
Segment capital growth 0.876
***
 0.841
***
 0.753
***
 0.794
***
 0.661
***
 0.871
***
 0.643
***
 1.023
***
 
Ln capital value
1
 0.144
**
 -0.477
***
 -0.062 -0.154
**
 -0.209
***
 -0.753
***
 -0.554
***
 -0.203
**
 
Excess yield (+)
1
 0.866
***
 1.254
***
 0.699
***
 0.505
***
 0.591
**
 0.076 -0.256 -0.493
*
 
Excess yield (-)
1
 -0.857
***
 0.060 -0.139 -0.820
***
 -1.674
***
 -2.105
***
 -2.441
***
 -1.692
***
 
Sold next quarter -0.093 -1.713
**
 0.496 -0.168 -0.792 -2.297
**
 -0.567 1.816
***
 
Insurance company Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out 
Pension fund -0.846
***
 -0.089 0.254 -0.680
**
 -0.368 -0.075 -0.834
***
 0.194 
Unit-linked fund 0.583
**
 -1.073
**
 -0.374 0.038 -0.608 0.276 -0.987
**
 0.148 
Open-ended fund 0.023 -1.075
**
 0.465 -0.359 -0.538
*
 0.440 -0.395 -0.170 
Listed property co -0.603
*
 0.827 0.369 -0.424 -0.314 1.208 -0.424 0.290 
Closed-end fund 0.937 1.921
*
 2.162
***
 -0.454 0.430 0.537 0.438 -0.576 
Other owner type -0.273 -0.379 -0.248 -0.304 0.081 0.336 -0.166 0.057 
Constant -3.408
***
 6.691
***
 -0.746 1.786
*
 1.034 9.623
***
 6.029
***
 2.833
*
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.158 0.201 0.070 0.071 0.045 0.113 0.089 0.092 
F-statistic 22.65 22.58 36.95 19.77 14.40 22.21 35.28 37.59 
Probability F = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No of observations 8613 7849 7331 7148 6612 6308 6169 5986 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
1 
These control variables are measured as at Q2 2007 in each case. 
  
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2953-1 
 
Appendix Table A2: Rental value growth regression results 
 
 Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter 
 2007Q3 2007Q4 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 
Segment rental growth 0.658
***
 0.986
***
 0.636
***
 0.565
***
 0.638
***
 0.819
***
 0.813
***
 0.950
***
 
Ln capital value
1
 0.036 0.026 -0.007 -0.013 -0.111
***
 -0.159
***
 -0.194
***
 -0.153
**
 
Excess yield (+)
1
 0.051 -0.098
**
 -0.062 -0.046 -0.040 -0.249
**
 0.059 -0.066 
Excess yield (-)
1
 -0.140 0.037 -0.193
*
 -0.116 -0.166
*
 -0.241 -0.423
**
 -0.435
**
 
Sold next quarter -0.417
***
 -0.240 0.004 0.091 -0.043 -0.020 0.027 0.220 
Insurance company Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out 
Pension fund -0.006 0.019 -0.044 -0.143 -0.019 -0.033 0.009 0.130 
Unit-linked fund 0.096 -0.032 -0.065 -0.080 -0.140 0.033 0.161 0.268 
Open-ended fund 0.093 -0.131 -0.138 -0.075 -0.078 -0.027 -0.083 0.342 
Listed property co 0.047 -0.014 -0.150 -0.137 -0.009 0.566 0.482 0.551
*
 
Closed-end fund 0.209 0.466 0.241 0.049 0.477
**
 0.514
***
 0.637 0.313 
Other owner type 0.061 -0.016 -0.153 -0.118 -0.062 0.136 0.543 0.590 
Constant -0.556 -0.388 0.277 0.400 1.882
***
 2.471
***
 2.650
***
 2.026
*
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.117 0.051 0.014 0.017 0.025 0.202 0.188 0.112 
F-statistic 31.99 15.39 4.70 4.94 9.21 44.71 39.11 34.32 
Probability F = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No of observations 8613 7849 7331 7148 6612 6308 6169 5986 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
1 
These control variables are measured as at Q2 2007 in each case. 
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Appendix Table A3: Yield impact regression results  
 
 Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter 
 2007Q3 2007Q4 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 
Segment yield impact 0.777
***
 0.933
***
 0.546
***
 0.957
***
 0.707
**
 0.918
***
 0.778
***
 1.077
***
 
Ln capital value
1
 0.239
***
 -0.351
***
 0.0534 -0.132 -0.0624 -0.482
***
 -0.241
**
 -0.202
**
 
Excess yield (+)
1
 1.145
***
 1.733
***
 0.973
***
 0.632
***
 0.809
***
 0.342
**
 0.246 -0.170 
Excess yield (-)
1
 -0.518
**
 0.229 0.255 -0.684
***
 -1.428
***
 -1.553
***
 -2.017
***
 -1.146
***
 
Sold next quarter 0.132 -1.597
**
 0.745
*
 -1.381
***
 -1.975
***
 -2.103
*
 -0.694 0.877 
Insurance company Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out Hold-out 
Pension fund -0.769
**
 0.0916 0.266 -0.413 -0.104 0.200 -0.440 0.168 
Unit-linked fund 0.553
*
 -0.788
*
 -0.496 0.232 -0.253 0.486 -0.600 0.147 
Open-ended fund 0.0606 -0.818
*
 0.405 -0.245 -0.315 0.588 -0.191 -0.192 
Listed property co -0.203 1.046 0.809
*
 -0.547 -0.267 1.286 -0.425 -0.822 
Closed-end fund 0.863 1.818
*
 1.943
***
 -0.421 0.0418 0.201 0.470 -1.287 
Other owner type -0.299 -0.223 -0.194 -0.159 0.326 0.417 0.0443 -0.0722 
Constant -5.439
***
 4.923
***
 -3.814
*
 1.813 -1.345 5.573
***
 2.014 3.227
**
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.112 0.202 0.060 0.049 0.033 0.096 0.077 0.062 
F-statistic 20.49 26.84 24.43 15.02 8.69 18.53 31.91 16.32 
Probability F = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No of observations 8613 7849 7331 7148 6612 6308 6169 5986 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
1 
These control variables are measured as at Q2 2007 in each case. 
